We make use of a new database on daily currency fund manager returns over a threeyear period, 2005-08. This higher frequency data allows us to estimate both alpha measures of performance and beta style factors on a yearly basis, which in turn allows us to test for persistence. We find no evidence to support alpha persistence; a manager's alpha in one year is not significantly related to his alpha in the prior year. On the other hand, there is substantial evidence for style persistence; funds that rely on carry, trend or value trading or with a long/short bias toward currency volatility are likely to maintain that style in the following year. In addition, we are able to examine the performance of managers that survive through the entire sample period, versus those that drop out. We find significant differences in both the investment styles of living versus deceased funds, as well as their realized alpha performance measures. We conjecture that both style differences and ineffective market timing, rather than market conditions, have impacted performance outcomes and induced some managers to close their funds.
Introduction
A large number of academic and professional studies support the notion that various types of currency trading strategies can be quite profitable.
1 Knowing that currency alpha can be easily transported into a wide range of investment products, the asset management industry is naturally very interested in currency as an asset class.
However, recent performance of currency managers has been disappointing. For example, both the Parker FX index and the Barclay Currency Traders Index (BCTI), which track the performance of currency managers, have underperformed cash (risk free returns) over the three years ending March 2008 (see Table 1 ). 2 Performance over a three-year term is an important measure as it sometimes is associated with the "average life" of an investment mandate.
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In part, these lacklustre returns may reflect the disappointing performance of various well-known currency strategies such as carry trading, trend following, and value 1 Research has focused on three types of trading strategies. The carry trade or forward rate bias strategy relies on the general tendency for currencies with high interest rates to appreciate. See Froot and Thaler (1990) for a survey and Burnside, et al. (2006) for a recent study. Technical trend following strategies rely on persistent movements in spot exchange rates. See Irwin and Park (2007) and Neely, Weller and Ulrich (2007) for surveys. Value investing strategies based on mean reversion to long run PPP exchange rates offer another approach. Studies prepared at Citibank (2003) and Deutsche Bank (2007) suggest that simple value trading strategies have been profitable. 2 Some alternative currency managers' indices (the CTA Equal Weighted Currency Index and the CTA Asset Weighted Currency Index prepared by the Centre for International Securities and Derivatives Markets) show a positive return over this period. Nevertheless, opinion in the currency management industry remains strong that average returns have been poor in this period.
investing. Figure This may not be a surprise given the climb in the spot EUR/USD rate towards 1.60, presumably further away from its "fair" value.
In earlier research, Pojarliev and Levich (PL, 2008) show that a significant part of the variation of the returns of professional currency managers can be explained by these three trading strategies and an indicator of currency volatility. PL redefine the alpha in currency management as only that portion of the excess returns which can not be explained by these four factors. In this paper, we take a closer look at the returns of professional currency managers by estimating their alpha performance measures and style betas over successive annual intervals. We are interested in the following questions: First, is past performance any indication for future performance (are alphas persistent)? Second, are investment styles (beta exposure) persistent? Third, what differences in performance are there between funds that survive throughout the sample period and those that do not? And finally, what explains difference in performance between funds that survive and those that do not?
To address these questions, we rely on data for 80 currency managers for three years between April 2005 and March 2008. We estimate alpha performance measures and style betas using the four factor model proposed in PL (2008) . We use higher frequency, weekly return data to obtain efficient parameters estimates for annual periods. Moreover, our database includes "dead funds" which allows us to correct for backfill and survivorship bias, and examine differences between living and deceased funds.
Overall, the results are quite interesting. We find no alpha persistence. Past performance by an individual manager seems to offer no indication for his future performance. However, we detect significant style persistence indicating that managers have a tendency to stick to the same investment style (or strategy). This may be good as it raises investor confidence that managers will stick with their original or mandated strategy. But at the same time, persistence suggests that managers are less willing to exploit market timing or reallocate their positions when other strategies look more promising. Because consultants usually "penalize" managers who do not stick to the same investment style, some style persistence may be an attempt by managers to enhance credibility with investment consultants.
We also find some important differences between managers who perform well (and survive) versus managers who perform poorly (and drop out of the database). Not surprisingly, the set of funds that died over our sample achieved a significant negative alpha and an alpha significantly less than for funds that survived until the ending date.
Moreover, the surviving or live funds showed greater association (in terms of R-squared) with the four style factors than those funds that performed poorly and eventually died. Furthermore, contrary to the presumption of the market that underperformance of the trend-following rule has been responsible for the diminishing returns of professional currency managers, we find that the strong performance of the carry strategy until the credit crunch in the summer of 2007 was devastating for many managers, who apparently were betting on liquidation of carry trades.
In the next section of the paper, we lay out our methodology for relating currency fund returns to style factors and describe the data in our study. In section 3, we report our empirical evidence on currency fund performance over the entire three-year period for indices constructed to represent various groups of managers, including those who survive through the entire data sample (the "live" funds) and those who drop out (the "dead" funds). In section 4, we examine the empirical evidence for individual managers over the three-year period and over one-year intervals and report our results for persistence in alpha (i.e. performance) and persistence in beta (i.e. style). Conclusions and implications of our findings are in the final section.
Methodology and Data Description
To measure the systematic components of currency returns (the betas) and isolate the portion due to skill, we follow the approach used in PL (2008) and adopt a standard factor model of the form:
where R is the excess return generated by the currency manager, defined as the total return (
α is a measure of active manager skill, F is a beta factor, that requires a systematic risk premium in the market, β is a coefficient or factor loading that measures the sensitivity of the manager's returns to the factor, and ε is a random error term.
To implement this approach, we require data on currency manager returns and factors that proxy for types of trading strategies and exposures that currency managers would be likely to utilize. Our empirical proxies for these factors are based on data for the major currencies that make up the vast bulk of foreign exchange trading volume.
Currency Manager Returns
In this study, we aim to estimate alphas of currency managers over annual periods.
Thus, using monthly data is not an option as twelve observations are not enough to obtain robust estimates. It is challenging to obtain higher frequency data for the returns of professional currency managers as hedge fund data providers usually collect monthly performance data. In this study, we make use of a new database of currency managers who are part of the Deutsche Bank (DB) FXSelect platform. While FXSelect is a new venture, the platform is presumably an attractive means for professional currency managers to enhance their visibility and grow their client base.
As such, we believe that the FXSelect data offer a fair means of assessing performance in the currency management industry.
6 Most importantly for this study, daily returns data on the FXSelect platform are available, thus providing us with sufficient data to conduct an analysis of 12-month periods. 4 The April 2007 survey of global foreign exchange turnover conducted by the Bank for International Settlements in 2007 shows that the G10 currencies accounted for an average 90.1% of all currency turnovers. 5 We are grateful to Neville Bulgin and Rashid Hoosenally from Deutsche Bank for supplying the data. More information about FXSelect can be find in the brochure "FXSelect: An Asset Allocation Solution," Deutsche Bank, Global Markets Foreign Exchange, 2006. 6 Many (about 25%) of the managers in the FXSelect database are also included in other well known hedge fund databases (CISDM and TASS). As another example for the visibility of the platform, Deutsche Bank provided daily returns data (gross of fees) for all managers who were actively trading on the platform since its exception. To correct for accounting errors and eliminate outliers, we transformed the daily returns into weekly returns by using
Wednesday observations. 7 Weekly data provide 52 observations for each 12-month period, which is sufficient to obtain reasonably efficient parameter estimates with a four factor model.
Backfill and Survivorship biases
Performance evaluation needs to control for the usual biases affecting databases. In particular, backfill and survivorship biases might be severe. As indicated earlier, managers were required to submit at least 18 months of performance data before being considered for the platform. As a manager could choose the time when to approach Deutsche Bank, waiting for the "best" 18 months of past performance would have been possible. To correct for backfill bias, we use returns after a manager has actually joined the platform and started trading. Also, during our sample period, many managers have joined and exited the platform due to a poor performance. We label these managers "dead" funds. highlights the necessity of including the performance of dead funds in the analyses. 8 We obtained data for 80 funds in total, but only 15 of these funds had a complete 3-year track record.
Data for Risk Factors Carry Factor
We use the Deutsche Bank G10 Harvest Index as the proxy for the returns of a carry strategy. 9 This index reflects the return of being long the 3 high-yielding currencies against being short the 3 low-yielding currencies within the G10 currency universe.
The index is rebalanced quarterly. Every quarter the currencies are re-ranked according to their current 3-month Libor rate. The Bloomberg code for this factor is DBHVG10U Index.
Trend Factor
As a proxy for the trend-following factor, we use the AFX Currency Management
Index. 10 The AFX Index is based on trading in seven currency pairs weighted by their volume of turnover in the spot market, with returns for each pair based on an equally-weighted portfolio of three moving average rules (32, 61 and 117 days). 11 Earlier research by Lequeux and Acar (1998) showed that this measure was a good proxy for a trend-following style among professional managers. The AFX Index is a well established proxy for trend-following strategies. It has been used for a number of years in various research papers, and therefore is known to researchers in this field.
Value Factor
We use the Deutsche Bank FX PPP Index as the proxy for the returns of a value strategy. To gauge relative value, Deutsche Bank prepares a ranking based on the average daily spot rate over the last three months divided by the PPP exchange rate as published annually by the OECD. The FX PPP index reflects the return of being long the 3 currencies with the highest rank (undervalued currencies) against being short the 3 currencies with the lowest rank (overvalued currencies) within G10 currency universe. The Bloomberg code for this factor is DBPPPUSF Index.
Currency Volatility Factor
We use the Deutsche Bank Currency Volatility Index as the proxy for foreign exchange volatility. This index is calculated as the weighted average of 3-month implied volatility for nine major currency pairs (as provided by the British Bankers Association) with weights based on trading volume in the BIS surveys. 12 The
Bloomberg code for this factor is CVIX Index.
Empirical Results on Currency Return Indices

Grouping Managers into Fund of Funds
To measure the overall returns for managers included on DB FXSelect, we construct several portfolios representing all available funds and certain subsets of funds. The first "fund-of-funds" (FoF) portfolio is compromised of equally weighted positions in each of the funds available on the platform on every Wednesday over the sample period. The return on this index can be defined as:
where R j.t is the weekly return for manager j at time t n t is the number of managers available on the platform at time t However, almost all of the performance is generated in the last 12 months. This performance pattern is consistent with the performance of the Parker FX index and the BCTI (see Table 1 ).
14 To gain additional perspective on the performance of funds on the DB FXSelect platform, we construct two other portfolios, one consisting only of "dead" funds, i.e.
the funds which were no longer on the platform in April 2008, and a second portfolio of "live" funds, i.e. those that were still active as of April 2008. The returns on these two funds are defined in an analogous way to our FoF, namely
where D y j R , is the weekly return for manager of dead fund j at time t L y j R , is the weekly return for manager of live fund j at time t 13 The annualized Sharpe ratio of the FoF portfolio is 0.56, comparable with the Sharpe ratios of the S&P 500 index (0.30), MSCI World index (0.71) and the Lehman Global Aggregate bond index (0.75) during this period. Furthermore, the attraction of currencies as an alpha source is visible trough the low correlation with the other asset classes. The correlation of the returns on the FoF portfolio with the returns on the S&P 500, MSCI World and Lehman Global Aggregate indices is -0.4%, 12% and 23%, respectively. The Sharpe ratio is computed as the average excess annualized monthly return (including dividends) divided by the annualized standard deviation of the excess returns. We use the 1-month LIBID (LIBOR less 12.5 bps) as the risk free rate. 14 The correlation over this 3-year period between the monthly returns on the FoF portfolio and the monthly returns on the Parker FX index and the returns on the BCTI is 67% and 65%, respectively. 
Overall, the results in Table 2 returns. Trend appears to be the most significant factor. The trend coefficient is 0.40, larger than for any other factor and highly significant. On average, the managers on the FXSelect platform seem to rely on trend-following. The trend factor alone explains 40% of the variability of the excess returns of the "FoF" portfolio (we have regressed the returns of "FoF" portfolio on each individual factor, but do not report the results). The carry coefficient is also positive and significant. The value coefficient is significant but negative, indicating that on average managers were positioned to profit from further deviations from PPP. The volatility coefficient is positive but not significant at the 10% level in a 2-tail test.
Our point estimate for alpha in the "FoF" portfolio is zero and not significant. This result implies that managers included in the FXSelect platform were not able to generate alpha on average between April 2005 and March 2008. This confirms the presumption in the market that this period has been extremely challenging for currency managers. It is also consistent with previous research (PL 2008 ) that as a group, currency managers were not able to generate significant alpha returns over the long run (between 1990 and 2006) . The returns in our sample are gross of fees, which means that the average alpha would be negative after management fees. Managers often charge a 2% per annum management fee and 20% performance fee, but fees do vary.
As the population of funds in the FXSelect platform changed over the 3-year period, it is interesting to explore differences in the performance of Live versus Dead funds, as defined by equations (3) and (4). Figure 5 reveals that live funds achieved a cumulative value of 108.7 far better than dead funds where value sank to only 91.6 after 3 years. Put differently, the live funds earned about 2.8% per annum (with an information ratio of 0.91) compared to dead funds which earned -2.8% per annum (with an information ratio of -1.21). 15 We examine the performance of live and dead funds more closely with various regression tests. Several observations stand out in Table 2 .
First, the alpha for the "Live" portfolio is quite high at almost 3 bps per week (or 1.4% per year). Although, not significant, this alpha suggests that this group of managers might have at least roughly covered their management fees. The alpha for the "Dead" portfolio is negative and significant. The "dead" managers lost about 6.5 bps per week (or roughly 3.3% per year). A t-test for the equality of the alphas of the "Live" and the "Dead" portfolio rejects the null hypothesis of equal means at the 95% confidence level (p-value = 0.0107). This may well explain why the "dead" funds exited the trading platform.
Second, the "live" managers have a positive and significant carry coefficient, but the "dead" managers have a negative and significant carry coefficient. Both groups are significantly exposed to trend, although the "live" managers have almost twice as much trend exposure as the "dead" managers. This is a very interesting result as it suggests that "betting against carry" was an important reason why the "dead" managers underperformed. There has been a presumption in the market, that the recent underperformance of trend-following rules (the AFX is roughly flat in the period under consideration) has been the main reason for the disappointing performance of professional currency managers. Our results suggest that this 15 An information ratio is the ratio of excess returns divided by their standard deviation. Third, the "live" managers have a negative and significant exposure to the value factor and the "dead" managers have a positive, but not significant value coefficient.
Betting against PPP and for continuation of departures from fair value seems to have helped the surviving managers to remain on the platform.
Finally, the R-square for the "live" managers (55%) is much higher than the 18% Rsquare for "dead" managers. Anson (2008) theorizes that there is a trade-off between beta style returns and alpha returns. In short, strategies that mimic an index cannot earn returns that lead to outperformance. In an earlier study (PL, 2008) , we found evidence supporting Anson's conjecture, namely that currency managers with high Rsquare tend to have lower alpha, and vice versa. In the DB FXSelect sample which includes live and dead funds, our results suggest that live managers tended to track the four factors more closely, earning beta returns, which should have helped them remain in operation. And indeed the live managers in our sample earned positive (although not significant) alpha as well. With weaker linkages to the four style factors, the dead managers were positioned to execute "pure" alpha seeking strategies.
Unfortunately, in this instance, the dead managers realized significant negative alpha.
So while being an alpha manager is good in the sense that it would justify active management fees -it is good only as long as the managers are able to deliver positive returns. Beta chasers might find it more difficult to justify alpha fees, but sticking close to the benchmark (the four trading strategies) has apparently helped them to stay in business. This result is consistent with a common strategy in the asset management industry. The bulk of assets under management are allocated close to the benchmark as large deviations from the benchmark expose the manager to significant business risk in case of underperformance.
To better understand this anomaly of high (low) R-square and high (low) alpha, we re-estimated the regressions for "live" and "dead" funds in Table 2 including quadratic terms for each factor to test for market timing. 16 The results for "live" managers show positive and significant timing ability with respect to the trend following factor (see Table 3 ). Once this effect is included, the point estimate for alpha for live managers drops to -2.7 bps per week from +2.7 bps per week.,
suggesting that all of their alpha could be accounted for by timing skills in trend following.
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The "dead" managers also have positive timing skill in trend, but on the other hand, they exhibit negative timing skills for volatility. 18 The actual returns of "dead" managers were made worse by taking positions that faltered when volatility increased.
Overall, our analysis suggests that market timing skills had no significant positive impact on the returns of dead managers. 
Empirical Results for Individual Managers
Full three-year sample period Table 4 summarizes the results for the individual currency managers with a track record spanning the entire 3-year period. The first row of Table 4 shows the results for an equally weighted portfolio ("Index" portfolio) consisting of all 15 managers. As in the case of the "Live" and "Dead" portfolios, this is a backward looking exercise as we did not know which managers who were on the platform in April 2005 would remain until March 2008.
For the 15 individual managers, Table 4 shows that trend was the most important factor over the 3-year period. Trend is significant for more than half of the managers (8). Carry is significant for 7 managers, but three of the managers had a significant negative exposure to carry. It seems that while 25% of the managers were exhibiting carry exposure, a similar number were betting on liquidation of carry trades. Value was significant only for 5 managers and four of these managers had a negative exposure to value, i.e. they were betting for further deviation from PPP. Volatility was significant for 4 managers -two managers would have benefited from falling volatility environment (the volatility coefficient was negative and significant) and two managers would have benefited from rising volatility environment (positive and significant volatility beta). Finally, none of the managers was able to deliver 19 A t-test for the equality of the alphas estimated with the 4-factor model and with the market timing model did not rejects the null hypothesis of equal means for the dead managers. Market timing did not improve the returns of the dead managers as the positive market timing in trend was offset with negative market timing in volatility.
significant alpha as defined by our four factor model. Manager L28 was the best of all with alpha estimated at 12 bps per week (about 6.0% per year) and significant at the 90% confidence level. Table 5 reports the annualized excess returns, standard deviations and information ratios for these 15 managers. The average excess annual return is positive, ranging from -3.30% (L58) to 16.10% (L29) and the volatility ranges from 3.53% (L10) to 19.28% (L29). The average information ratio is 0.37. However, this average information ratio overstates the performance of the average manager during this challenging period as it is not adjusted for survivorship bias. The fourth column of Table 5 ranks the managers by their information ratio. Manager L28 is ranked first (IR equals 1.17) and manager L58 is ranked last (fifteen) with an information ratio of -0.35.
We also report the annualized alpha return, the standard deviation of alpha returns (tracking error) and the alternative information ratio (IR*) as defined in PL (2008).
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Rank* is therefore the ranking of the managers by their IR*. Note that manager L35 experiences the largest improvement in ranking; he jumps to place 8 th from place 12 th .
This is not a surprise as his R-square was the second smallest (see Table 3 ). Less than 6% of the variability of his returns could be explained by the exposure to the four factors. 20 The information ratio (IR) is defined as the ratio of excess returns to their standard deviation. If we assume that all returns are excess returns, then IR = R j /σ(R j ) , where R j is the annualized average excess return and σ(R j ) is its annualized standard deviation. Using equation (1) to estimate alpha, PL define the alternative information ratio as IR* = ά j /σ(ά j ).
The average IR* is smaller (0.24) than the average IR (0.37). This suggests that significant part of the returns of the average manager could be contributed to exposure to the four risk factors and it is not pure alpha.
Successive one-year samples
To investigate performance and style persistence, we estimate equation (1) using 52 weekly observations on successive one-year periods. Table 6 Several results stand out from the analysis. First, the data continue to support the four factor model over shorter periods, specifically for these three one-year sub-periods.
To Looking at individual managers, the median R-squares are 19.7%, 20.8% and 26.2%
over the three successive periods. On a year-by-year basis, between 10-25% of individual managers exhibit an R-square exceeding 50% (the highest R-square, 81%, was recorded for manager L9 in the third sub-period), while roughly the same fraction produce an R-square under 10%.
Second, the importance of trend seems to be declining while the importance of carry seems to be rising and exceeded trend in the last sub-period. Table 9 28% of the managers significantly exposed to it. Ironically, this was also the period where trend started to perform well again as a strategy. Trend yielded 0.1% in the first sub-period, 1.11% in the second sub-period and 6.12% in the last sub-period. Carry shows a similar picture: it yielded its worst performance (-3.4%) in the third subperiod, where 50% of the managers were significantly exposed to it (18 with positive coefficient and 5 with a negative coefficient). This suggests a reason to avoid not only "crowded" trades, but also "crowded" styles as well. When a trading style becomes "crowded" it appears as if performance in that style declines. 21 21 The relationship between crowding and performance is a topic we leave for future research.
Third, only a small fraction of managers (10-17%) were significantly exposed to value and volatility with the exception of the last sub-period in which value was the second most important factor (after carry) with 37% of the managers exhibiting significant value beta. However, while half of these managers were betting for meanreversion towards the PPP exchange rate, the other half was betting for further deviation from PPP.
Performance persistence
To investigate the question of whether managers who have been performed well in the past continue to perform well in the future, we follow Aggarwal and Jorion (2008) and report the results for the following regression Where α j is the excess return for fund manager j that is not explained by the four factors, or
Table 10 presents the results. We have 21 funds in the second sub-period, which were also active in the first sub-period and 37 in the third sub-period, which were also active in the second sub-period. Neither regression yields a significant coefficient on the previous year's alpha. This result suggests that past excess performance as measured by alpha is not related to future performance. Although, δ 1 is positive, it is not significantly different from zero.
As an alternative way to gauge performance persistence, we form portfolios based on performance quartiles. The performance of the best performing (ranked by alpha return, performance in the first quartile Q1) managers in the first sub-period is aggregated by constructing an equally weighted portfolio, labelled the Q1 portfolio.
We also aggregate the performance of the bottom quartile managers into a Q4 portfolio. Comparing the performance of the Q1 and the Q4 portfolio in the second sub-period is a way to gauge persistence. 22 The average weekly alpha for the Q1 portfolio in the second sub-sample was 1.4 bps (or 0.7% annualized), higher than the average weekly alpha of the Q4 portfolio -11 bps (or -5.8% annualized). This is an indication for some persistence. However, a t-test for the difference in the means does not reject the hypothesis of equal average alpha.
We performed the same exercise for the third sub-period (comparing the performance of managers who were in the top quartile in the second sub-period with the performance of the managers who were in the bottom quartile in the second subperiod). Again, there is no evidence of performance persistence. The average alpha for the Q4 portfolio was even higher (3.6 bps or 1.88% annualized) than the average alpha of the Q1 portfolio (2.8 bps or 1.46% annualized). Thus, the managers who 22 Managers who did not survive during the following 12 months are included as long as they are on the platform. Although Carpenter and Lynch (1999) recommend comparing top and bottom decile portfolios, because of our small sample size, we follow Aggarwal and Jorion (2008) and compare top and bottom quartile portfolios Note, that the methodology in equation (6) estimates the average persistence (from year t to year t+1) for a cross section of managers rather than the persistence over time for a specific manager. 23 Thus, our rejection of persistence does not mean that not a single manager is able to deliver persistent performance. Indeed, in a previous study Levich and Pojarliev (2008) report that of the 8 managers with significant alpha over a 3-year period (2001-03), fully 7 managers continued to make positive alpha in the following 3-year period . 24 No manager showed significant alpha in the second period who did not produce alpha in the first sub-period. Although, the average manager does not show persistence, some skilled managers do.
Style persistence
To check for style persistence, we perform regressions similar to (6) estimating cross sectional regressions for each one of the four betas. Table 11 reports the results.
The results indicate strong persistence for the trend factor and carry factor. The coefficients for both carry and trend for year t-1 are positive and highly significant.
This suggests that managers who are exposed to carry in period t-1 are likely to maintain significant carry exposure in period t. The same result is valid for the trend factor. Value is persistent only from the second into the third sub-period, but not from the first into the second sub-period. We do not detect persistence for volatility, which is also consistent with the finding that this is the least important factor. 23 The later would require many estimates of alpha for manager j over successive periods to estimate that manager's δ 1 persistence factor. 24 We should caution that in this paper our tests for performance persistence rely on performance measured over only one year. The one-year period may be too short to accurately access underlying performance. The differences between performance persistence when estimating performance over different periods (1-year, 3-years and 5-years) is a topic we leave for a future research. In addition, we Style persistence can be interpreted as either good or bad news. It is good news, since an investor might expect that his currency manager will continue to follow the same investment style. This would allow endowment and pension fund sponsors to issue mandates that diversify their style exposure. On the other hand, it is bad news, since style persistence would indicate less market timing ability, i.e. switching between styles when one style fails to perform well.
Conclusions
In this paper, we estimate cross sectional annual alphas for professional currency to test for performance and style persistence. We find no indication of performance persistence, but we do find statistically significant evidence of style persistence.
These results have important implications for the investment management industry.
Plan sponsors should be careful when selecting currency managers based only on past examine only two intervals, which may be too few to detect persistence especially if persistence is weak.
performance data. As in other venues of investment management, in this sample of currency managers it appears that past performance is no indication for future performance. On the other hand, style persistence indicates that choosing currency managers with different styles makes sense as they are likely to maintain their style, and thus continue to offer a diversification benefit. Plan sponsors usually seek to hire more than one currency manager with different styles to obtain diversification benefits. From this perspective, our evidence for style persistence is welcome.
However, style persistence may imply that individual managers are less able to exploit market timing ability.
In addition, we document some significant differences between managers who did not survive our three-year sample and managers who were still alive and active in April 2008. Not surprisingly, we find that surviving managers produced alpha that was higher than exiting managers, and with a difference of about 9.5 bps per week (or nearly 5% per year), the difference is both statistically and economically significant.
Our analysis suggests that living mangers generally tracked our four factors more closely (with a higher R-square) than managers that would eventually die. Sticking closer to the "benchmarks" has helped some managers to stay in business.
Components of their investment strategies, as evidenced by the sign of factor coefficients, varied as well. Contrary to the presumption in the market that the recent underperformance of trend-following strategies was the main reason for the lacklustre performance of currency managers over the last three years, we found that "betting for 
Figure 1: Cumulative Excess Returns of Currency Trading Strategies
The Carry Index return is represented by the Deutsche Bank G10 Harvest Index as the proxy for the returns of a carry strategy. This index reflects the return of being long the 3 high-yielding currencies against being short the 3 low-yielding currencies within G10 currency universe. The index is rebalanced quarterly.
The Trend Index return is represented by the AFX Currency Management Index. The AFX Index is based on trading in seven currency pairs (EUR-USD, USD-JPY, USD-CHF, GBP-USD, EUR-JPY, EUR-GBP, and EUR-CHF) weighted by their volume of turnover in the spot market, with returns for each pair based on an equally-weighted portfolio of three moving average rules (32, 61 and 117 days).
The Value Index return is represented by the Deutsche Bank FX PPP Index. The average daily spot rate over the last three months is divided by the PPP exchange rate as published annually by the OECD and ranked. This index reflects the return of being long the 3 currencies with the highest rank (undervalued currencies) against being short the 3 currencies with the lowest rank (overvalued currencies) within G10 currency universe. The FoF portfolio is compromised of equally weighted positions in each of the funds available on the Deutsche Bank FXSelect platform on every Wednesday over the sample period. These are gross returns before taking fees into account. Source: Deutsche Bank.
Parker FX index reported excess returns are the net of fees returns on the FX Parker Index less the risk free rate. As a proxy for the risk free rate we use 1-month LIBID (LIBOR less 12.5 bps). Source: Parker Global Strategies, LLC and Bloomberg.
Parker FX Index scaled returns are the net of fees returns on the Parker FX index, in excess of short term interest rates and scaled to a 5% volatility. Source: Parker Global Strategies, LLC.
Barclay Currency Traders Index returns are the net of fees returns on the Barclay Currency Traders Index less the risk free rate. As a proxy for the risk free rate we use 1-month LIBID (LIBOR less 12.5 bps). Source: BarclayHedge, British Bankers Association and Bloomberg. The Deutsche Bank G10 Harvest Index is the proxy for the returns of a Carry strategy. This index reflects the return of being long the 3 high-yielding currencies against being short the 3 low-yielding currencies within G10 currency universe. The index is rebalances quarterly. Every quarter the currencies are re-ranked according to their current 3 months Libor rate. Source: Deutsche Bank and Bloomberg.
The AFX Index reflects returns on a trend following strategy involving three moving average rules applied to seven currency pairs, weighted by the volume of turnover in the spot market. Monthly data are available at http://cwis.livjm.ac.uk/AFE/AFE_docs/AFX_Monthly.xls. Source: Liverpool John Moores University.
The Deutsche Bank FX PPP Index is the proxy for the returns of a Value strategy. The average daily spot rate over the last three months is divided by the PPP exchange rate as published annually by the OECD and ranked. This index reflects the return of being long the 3 currencies with the highest rank (undervalued currencies) against being short the 3 currencies with the lowest rank (overvalued currencies) within G10 currency universe. Source: Deutsche Bank and Bloomberg.
The Deutsche Bank Currency Volatility Index (CVIX index) is the proxy for the foreign exchange volatility. It is calculated as the weighted arithmetic average of the 3 months level of implied volatility for all major currency pairs (provided by BBA) and weighted by traded market volume. Source: Deutsche Bank and Bloomberg. 
, where R j is the annualized average excess return and σ(R j ) is its annualized standard deviation.
, where α j is the average annual alpha estimated from equation (1) and σ(α j ) is its annualized standard deviation, or tracking error. 
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